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Is Prayer Constitutional at Municipal Council Meetings?
By Thomas A. Schweitzer
The Supreme Court may
be about to make a major
decision involving the First
Amendment Establishment
Clause1 and local governments in this year’s United
States Supreme Court Term.
On May 20, 2013, the Court
granted the petition for
certiorari of the Town of
Greece, New York in a case
challenging official prayers
at town council meetings.2 It
is hard to imagine a greater facial violation of “the wall
of separation between church and state”3 than prayer at
a session of an American law-making body.4 Nevertheless, the constitutionality of legislative prayer has been
generally upheld since the Supreme Court decided
Marsh v. Chambers in 1983.5

The Lemon test, as it is known, represented the
Court’s attempt to accommodate competing if not
contradictory goals of the Establishment Clause: On the
one hand, the Clause “severs the link between Church
and State”; on the other hand, it “does not disassociate
religion from government.”8 The Lemon test has been
widely criticized by commentators and at least seven
Supreme Court justices,9 and it has been significantly
watered down in more recent cases.10 Nevertheless, it
never has been officially repudiated by the Court and is
frequently applied by the Court in Establishment Clause
cases.11

This article will discuss Galloway v. Town of Greece,
the case currently pending at the Supreme Court. It will
begin with a brief discussion of Lemon v. Kurtzman6 and
Marsh to provide the background necessary for understanding the issues raised by Galloway. The article then
will examine the district and circuit court decisions in
Galloway and the Establishment Clause issues posed by
the case. Next, it will note issues raised by other lower
court decisions involving legislative prayer after Marsh.

The facts in Marsh were as follows: The Nebraska
Legislature13 began each session with a prayer offered
by a chaplain who was chosen every two years by the
Legislative Council and paid with public funds. Ernest Chambers, a state legislator who thought that this
violated the Establishment Clause, sued to enjoin the
practice. The defendants included State Treasurer Frank
Marsh and Robert Palmer, a Presbyterian minister who
had held the chaplaincy position for sixteen years.

Moving from description of the rather muddled
state of precedent in this area to the Supreme Court’s
duty, in deciding Galloway, to clarify and decide the
constitutional issues, the article will recommend that
the Court not only affirm the Second Circuit’s decision
in Galloway but also either overturn or sharply limit
the Marsh precedent. As this recommendation seems
unlikely to be followed, the article ends with a plea that
the Court decide Galloway in a way that provides lower
courts with greater guidance when addressing the
wide variety of fact patterns and legal issues raised by
municipal prayer cases after Marsh.

The federal district court applied the Lemon test
separately to the challenged practices of prayer and
funding for the chaplain. It upheld the constitutionality of offering daily prayers but concluded that use of
state funds to pay Reverend Palmer’s salary of $320
per month and to publish books of his prayers was
unconstitutional.14

Background: The Lemon Test and the Marsh
Case
In 1971, the Supreme Court announced in Lemon
v. Kurtzman what became the leading test for evaluating the constitutionality of a law or practice under the
Establishment Clause: “First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an
excessive government entanglement with religion.’”7
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Despite the fact that Lemon was the Court’s leading
Establishment Clause case, the Court declined to apply
the Lemon test twelve years later in Marsh v. Chambers.12
Instead, the Court invoked the early history of the Republic in rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge in
a case involving legislative prayer.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit held that actions of the Nebraska
Legislature had to be viewed as a whole because
“[t]he funding is inextricably bound up with the prayers
themselves.”15 It concluded that the chaplaincy practice
violated all three elements of the Lemon test and enjoined the entire practice.16
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and then
reversed the Eighth Circuit in an Opinion by Chief
Justice Warren Burger. The Court upheld the Nebraska
chaplaincy practice in its entirety.17 The lynchpin of the
Court’s decision was that the First Congress both ratified the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment,
and enacted a statute to pay chaplains. Indeed, a final
agreement was reached on the language of the Bill of
Rights on September 25, 1789, only three days after Con-
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gress passed the statute.18 The Court concluded that
those who drafted the First Amendment could not have
believed that paid chaplains violated the Establishment
Clause.
The Court declared that “the practice of opening
legislative sessions with prayer has become part of
the fabric of our society” and the practice of invoking
divine guidance on lawmakers “is simply a tolerable
acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the
people of this country.”19 Nor was paying the chaplain
of a particular denomination with public funds a violation of the Establishment Clause, the Court explained,
because the first Continental Congress had also compensated its chaplain.20 Furthermore, the Court held
that “absent proof that the chaplain’s reappointment
stemmed from an impermissible motive… his long
tenure does not in itself conflict with the Establishment
Clause.”21
In addition, the Court suggested that it was not
incumbent on courts to scrutinize legislative prayers in
order to eliminate sectarian messages. It stated: “The
content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where,
as here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any
one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief. That being so, it is not for us to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to parse the content of a particular prayer.”22
The only elaborations by the Supreme Court of its
holding in Marsh were provided in two subsequent cases: County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union23
and Lee v. Weisman.24 The Allegheny Court emphasized
that even the Marsh Court had recognized that not all
practices that were 200 years old were necessarily automatically constitutional and that legislative prayers
that affiliate the government with any one specific faith
or belief were unconstitutional. It further stated: “The
legislative prayers involved in Marsh did not violate
this principle because the particular chaplain had ‘removed all references to Christ.’”25
Public school commencements are functions of
state government and thus are subject to Establishment
Clause strictures. As in Marsh, the challenged event in
Lee v. Weisman was a prayer preceding the program.26
Because the Court in Lee squarely distinguished the
Marsh precedent,27 however, it has scant relevance to
legislative prayer.

Galloway in the District Court
Greece is a town of about 94,000 residents, located
just outside Rochester. Since 1999, the Greece Town
Council had arranged for religious invocations to be
delivered by clergy and other individuals at the beginning of its monthly meetings. Christian clergymen delivered the vast majority of the prayers.28 Beginning in
September 2007, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens,

neither of whom is a Christian, complained without
success to the town about its prayer practice.29 On
February 28, 2008, Galloway and Stephens, arguing that
the town’s prayer practices violated the Establishment
Clause, sued the town and Supervisor John Auberger
for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.
Although Galloway felt that prayer was inappropriate at government meetings, she only asked the
Town Board to make the prayers “nonsectarian.” Stephens regarded all legislative prayer as inappropriate
and believed that “sectarian prayers” were “more offensive than nonsectarian ones.”30 Plaintiffs contended
that Marsh and Allegheny forbade all sectarian prayer;
however, they did not oppose “inclusive and ecumenical” prayer.31 They also claimed that the town’s procedure for selecting clergy was unconstitutional because
it favored Christians over other faiths.32
The parties conducted extensive discovery, described in detail in the decision of United States District Court Judge Charles J. Siragusa. The district court
found that Supervisor John Auberger had instituted
the Town of Greece’s informal policy of inviting local
clergy to offer prayers at the beginning of Town Board
meetings in 1999 after he observed this practice at meetings of the Monroe County Legislature. From that time
through 2010, responsibility for inviting clergy to deliver prayers at Town Board meetings was delegated to
employees of the Town’s Office of Constituent Services.
They consulted a “Community Guide” published by
the Town Chamber of Commerce for a list of religious
organizations within the town’s borders. Before each
meeting, a clerk would make telephone calls to such
groups until she found a clergyman willing to offer the
prayer. In the course of time, groups who did not wish
to participate were removed and others were added.
Almost all places of worship in the Town of Greece
were Christian, as were most of the prayer givers.33
Some of the prayers were Christian in nature and contained explicit references to Jesus Christ.34 The district
court found no evidence that the town clerks who
selected the prayer givers were biased;35 they did not
attend the Board meetings themselves, and there was
no indication of their religious affiliation, if any. After
plaintiffs sued the Town, moreover, the clerk in charge
added a “Wiccan Priestess”36 and a Jewish layman to
the list of approved prayer givers. A representative of
the Baha’i Assembly of Greece had also been added to
the list and delivered an invocation at a Town Board
meeting during this period.37
Because there was little disagreement between the
parties on the underlying facts, Judge Siragusa decided
that a trial was unnecessary and the parties submitted
cross-motions for summary judgment. On August 5,
2010, he granted the Town’s motion and entered judgment in its favor and against the plaintiffs.
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The district court concluded that the Town of
Greece’s legislative prayer practices were consistent
with Marsh. It found that there was no indication in the
record that the town’s prayer policy had been established for an improper purpose such as “to proselytize
or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or
belief.”38 Instead, its policy was to invite all the denominations in the town and to even welcome volunteers,
like atheists and members of non-Judeo-Christian
religions, to give invocations.39
The court added that “[t]he mere fact that prayers
may contain a reference to Jesus or another deity does
not make them proselytizing. Instead, limited references such as, ‘in Jesus’s name,’ are, under the facts of this
case, ‘tolerable acknowledgment[s] of beliefs widely
held among the people of this country.’”40
The court also rejected the argument that only
nonsectarian prayer should be tolerated.41 In support
of this conclusion, it noted that legislative prayer in
Congress over the years had often been “overtly sectarian”42 and took “judicial notice” of two recent sectarian invocations that ministers had delivered in recent
months in the House of Representatives.43
Finally, the district court rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the town should instruct potential prayer
givers that their prayers should be “inclusive and ecumenical.”44 It found that “[p]laintiffs’ proposed nonsectarian policy, which would require town officials to differentiate between sectarian prayers and nonsectarian
prayers, is vague and unworkable, as Pelphrey demonstrates.”45 Accordingly, the court found as a matter of
law that the town had not violated the Establishment
Clause, and it granted the town’s motion for summary
judgment.

Galloway in the Second Circuit
In a unanimous decision, the Second Circuit
reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Town of Greece and remanded the case for
further proceedings and appropriate relief. The author
of the decision, Judge Guido Calabresi, initially noted
that the scope of the issues had narrowed on appeal, as
the plaintiffs had abandoned their argument that the
town intentionally discriminated against non-Christians in its selection of prayer givers.46
The only remaining issue on appeal was whether
the district court had erred in rejecting plaintiffs’ claim
that the town’s prayer practice had the effect, even if
not the purpose, of establishing religion in violation of
the Establishment Clause. The Second Circuit concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances,
the plaintiffs had demonstrated that the town’s prayer
practice impermissibly affiliated the town with a single
creed, Christianity.47
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After discussing the applicable law, the Second Circuit noted that there was no precise criterion or formula
for determining whether there was an Establishment
Clause violation in connection with legislative prayer.
Instead, as Judge Calabresi wrote, “we see ‘no testrelated substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.’”48
After reviewing the entire record, the court concluded
that the town’s prayer practice had to be viewed as an
endorsement of the Christian faith.
The Court found a number of facts that supported
this conclusion. It noted that “[i]n the town’s view, the
preponderance of Christian clergy was the result of a
random selection process.”49 However, the town had invited clergy almost exclusively from places of worship
within the town’s borders, which were overwhelmingly
Christian, while some town residents might be members of congregations outside the town or of no congregation at all. In addition, the town had neither informed
members of the public that they could volunteer to offer
prayers, nor had it publicly solicited prayer volunteers.
As a result, the town’s selection process could not result
in “a perspective that is substantially neutral amongst
creeds.”50 Instead, the process virtually ensured that a
Christian viewpoint overwhelmingly predominated.
Furthermore, the Court noted, prayer givers often
appeared to speak on behalf of all present and even the
town itself. Prayer givers often asked the audience to
participate and to signify their assent by standing or
bowing their heads. “It is no small thing for a nonChristian (or for a Christian, for that matter) to pray
‘in the name of Jesus Christ,’” the Court wrote.51 This
“placed audience members who were nonreligious or
adherents of non-Christian religions in the awkward
position of either participating in prayers invoking beliefs they did not share or appearing to show disrespect
for the invocation[.]”52 Thus, even though the prayers
refrained from proselytization, the unending succession of “often specifically sectarian Christian prayers”53
would create the impression in an objective, reasonable
person that “the town’s prayer practice associated the
town with the Christian religion.”54
The Court emphasized that it was not stating that
legislative prayers to open town meetings violated the
Establishment Clause, even if they occasionally were
sectarian in nature.55 The Constitution required, however, that the prayers offered “do not express an official
town religion, and do not purport to speak on behalf
of all the town’s residents or to compel their assent to
a particular belief.”56 In summary, “a legislative prayer
practice that, however well-intentioned, conveys to a
reasonable objective observer under the totality of the
circumstances an official affiliation with a particular
religion violates the clear command of the Establishment Clause.”57
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The Larger Context
Galloway is one of a number of cases decided by
lower courts involving challenges to legislative prayer
at the municipal level. (Interestingly, the absence of
reported cases involving challenges to chaplains in
state legislatures suggests that most of the states have
accepted Marsh and have not encountered difficulty in
applying its holding to their proceedings.)58 In fact, the
cases involving prayers at town and city council meetings reveal a distressing degree of divisiveness between
the dominant Christian prayer givers and adherents of
minority and non-Western religions, as well as among
the different Christian groups.59 It is regrettable that
prayers which no doubt are intended to bring community members together and to unite them in the important enterprise of self-government should engender
such disharmony.
This welter of cases may be due to the fact-andhistory-specific nature of the Court’s decision in Marsh.
(Galloway shares this fact-specific approach to deciding
the case.) In essence, federal courts called upon to adjudicate disputes about legislative prayer are engaged in
building a body of constitutional common law. Applying a strict version of the traditional rules for adjudicating only cases and controversies, one could argue that
the Supreme Court should not go beyond the specific
facts and legal issues present in Galloway when it decides the case.
Nevertheless, my view is that such a fact-specific
decision would be unfortunate. For three decades,
lower courts have struggled to understand and apply
Marsh to the legislative prayer controversies they were
called upon to adjudicate. These cases, of course, were
never heard by the Supreme Court. However, their
diverse fact patterns raise a number of issues that the
Court could—and should—address.
The major split among the approximately dozen
progeny of Marsh involves the issue of whether only
“nonsectarian” prayer is constitutional. Six courts have
answered this question in the affirmative,60 but at least
two have held that sectarian prayers, at least within
limits, can be constitutional.61 The reason for this seems
obvious: the ambiguous, even cryptic, language from
Marsh noted above.62
The Court observed that while Chaplain Robert E.
Palmer had earlier given explicitly Christian prayers
before the Nebraska Legislature, he had removed all
references to Christ after a 1980 complaint from a Jewish legislator.63 Thus, in context, one could understand
the Court’s statement to mean that Palmer’s prayers
were only constitutional because they were nonsectarian, and some courts have held thus.64
One could also understand the Court to mean that
so long as the speaker refrained from proselytizing or

disparaging other religions, there would be no constitutional problem, and that other forms of sectarian prayer
were permissible. Some courts have so held.65
Determining whether or not a prayer is “sectarian”
is not necessarily a straightforward matter. As noted
above, the court of appeals in Pelphrey observed that
counsel for plaintiff in that case deemed “Heavenly Father” and “Lord” nonsectarian, even though his clients
testified to the contrary.66 Judge Middlebrooks, dissenting in Joyner, claimed that “there is no clear definition
of what constitutes a ‘sectarian’ prayer.”67

The Author’s Recommendation
Thirty years of its misbegotten progeny have
exposed the deep flaws in Marsh, which arguably was
wrongly decided and inarguably failed to provide
adequate guidelines for deciding the controversies that
were certain to arise around the vexing issue of municipal legislative prayer. In deciding the constitutionality
of a hired, paid long-term chaplain, the Court gave no
guidance to town and city councils about how they
could administer a program of legislative prayer by
volunteers without violating the Establishment Clause.
By relying on Eighteenth Century history as the
basis for its decision and simply brushing aside the
dominant test, which it had fashioned over the years
to govern Establishment Clause cases,68 the Supreme
Court took the easy way out. It avoided a decision
which would no doubt have provoked a firestorm of
protest69 and it emerged relatively unscathed. But the
expediency of this approach came at the cost of engendering doctrinal confusion that has plagued lower
courts ever since. This time, at long last, the Court
should strive for a broad, comprehensive disposition
which seeks to resolve the many issues engendered by
Marsh and left unresolved for so long.
As part of its task in Galloway, the Court should
face forthrightly a regrettable consequence of applying the Marsh holding to municipal legislative prayer:
divisiveness and conflict among people of different
faiths.70 Such conflict arguably takes its greatest toll
when waged by members of the same local community.
The Supreme Court has highlighted divisiveness as
part of the entanglement “prong” of the Lemon test,71
and a noted authority asserted that “political division
on religious lines is one of the principal evils that [the]
First Amendment sought to forestall.”72
As Judge Calabresi noted in Galloway, “People with
the best of intentions may be tempted, in the course of
giving a legislative prayer, to convey their views of religious truth, and thereby run the risk of making others
feel like outsiders.”73
In my view, the progeny of Marsh at the municipal
level sadly mirror what Justice Felix Frankfurter called
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“the strife of sects.”74 The divisiveness is not theoretical; it is an unfortunate reality. Even without acting
with such an intention, many Christian prayer givers
in various parts of the country have delivered prayers
at city council meetings that appeared to be official.
Their effect was to affiliate the local government with
Christianity and to make nonbelievers and adherents
of nonwestern religions or no religion feel uncomfortable and feel like outsiders. Thirty years of divisiveness and judicial division are enough; Marsh should be
overruled.
And yet I am aware that such a decision could
be regarded as a radical one that could set off a furor
on the religious right. If total overruling is not possible, a coherent half measure would be to preserve
Marsh’s holding for state legislatures and Congress,
but to overrule it at the municipal level. While such a
course might seem inconsistent, a persuasive case for
it is made in the dissent of Judge Donald M. Middlebrooks in Pelphrey.75 He views Marsh as an “outlier in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence,”76 and argues that
the rationale for the Court’s decision based on 1789 history should not apply to local governments at a time
when Massachusetts and other states had established
churches.77 The Court could do worse than reach the
same conclusion.

(including at least one Member of today’s majority) have, in
separate opinions, repudiated the brain-spun ‘Lemon Test’ that
embodies the supposed principle of neutrality between religion
and irreligion.”) See also Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-399 (1993) (Scalia,
J. concurring in judgment) (collecting criticism of Lemon);
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J.
concurring); Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist.
v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994) (O’Connor, J. concurring
in part and concurring in judgment); County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-656, 672-673 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see
also Committee for Public Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Regan,
444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disparaging
“the Sisyphean task of trying to patch together the ‘blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier’ described in Lemon”); Roemer
v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring in judgment) (“I am no more reconciled now to
Lemon I than I was when it was decided…. The threefold test
of Lemon I imposes unnecessary, and…superfluous tests for
establishing [a First Amendment violation].”)
10.

See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-223 (1997) (quoting
Mitchell v. Helms 530 U.S. 793, 794 (2000)). The Supreme
Court recast the “entanglement” prong of the Lemon test
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effect.” Thus, the Court in effect conflated the effects and
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her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
Justice Kennedy introduced a “coercion test” in Lee v. Weisman,
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Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995);
see Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, South Carolina, 376 F.3d 292,
302, n.8 (4th Cir. 2004). Yet another test, the “totality of the
circumstances” test influenced by Justice O’Connor’s approach,
was applied by the Second Circuit in Galloway, as discussed
infra.

11.
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applied the Lemon test in thirty Establishment Clause cases in
the twenty years after Lemon v. Kurtzman.

12.

See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 796 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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NEBRASKA LEGISLATURE: A HISTORY OF THE UNICAMERAL. http://
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41.

Galloway v. Town of Greece, 732 F.Supp.2d at 241.

42.

Id. at 241-42.

43.

On April 15, 2010, Rev. Clyde Mighells, of Lighthouse Reformed
Church, ended his opening prayer with the words, “It is in
the blessed name of our Lord, Jesus Christ, that we lay these
requests at Your feet. Amen.” Id. at 242. On June 30, 2010, Rev.
Robert Henderson of First Baptist Church in Lincoln, Illinois,
ended his opening prayer with the words, “These things we
pray in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ. Amen.” Id.

44.

Id. at 243.

45.

Id. See Pelphrey v. Cobb County, Georgia, 547 F.3d 1263, 1266
(11th Cir. 2008). The Eleventh Circuit in Pelphrey squarely
rejected the claim of plaintiffs in that case that under
Marsh, only nonsectarian legislative prayers could satisfy
Establishment Clause requirements. See also id. at 1272.
(“[W]e would not know where to begin to demarcate the
boundary between sectarian and nonsectarian expressions.”).
It also noted that plaintiff taxpayers disagreed with their
counsel as to whether “Heavenly Father” and “Lord” were
nonsectarian.” Id.

46.

Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 26 (2d Cir. 2012).

47.

Id. at 34.

48.

Id. at 30.

49.

Id. at 31.

50.

Id.

51.

Id. See also Joyner v. Forsyth County, North Carolina, 653 F.3d
341, 354 (4th Cir. 2011) (“’To…Jewish, Muslim, Baha’I, Hindu,
or Buddhist citizens[,] a request to recognize the supremacy of
Jesus Christ and to participate in a civic function sanctified in
his name is a wrenching burden.’ See Amicus Br. of American
Jewish Congress et al. 8. Such burdens run counter to the
Establishment Clause…”).

52.

See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 32 (stressing the problem of persons
feeling obliged to show deference to prayers they did not
believe in, if only by standing and bowing their heads, lest they
be deemed disrespectful or irreverent).

53.

Id.

54.

Id.

55.

See id. at 34. The Second Circuit noted that a number of
cases had interpreted Allegheny’s gloss on Marsh to preclude
sectarian prayer. The court denied, however, that the
Establishment Clause precludes all legislative invocations
that are “denominational in nature” (which evidently means
“sectarian”), as these cases seem to suggest. The court gave two
reasons for this conclusion. First, in disapproving of the school
district’s action in Lee instructing the rabbi to make his prayers
nondenominational, the Supreme Court had not favored
establishment of “a civic religion” any more than the original
form of Establishment. See also id. at 29. Second, even after
Allegheny, it was difficult to read Marsh as holding that every
denominational prayer affiliated the government with a religion
and thereby violated the Establishment Clause.

56.

Id. at 34.

57.

Id.

58.

The only exception is Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F.Supp.2d 1103
(S.D.Indiana 2005), stay denied, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006), rev’d
and remanded for lack of standing, 506 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2007). The
district court had found that the legislative prayer practices of
the Indiana House of Representatives in the 2005 session “when
viewed as a whole, are well outside the boundaries established
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by the Supreme Court in Marsh v. Chambers.” 400 F.Supp.2d at
1125-26.
59.

E.g., Wynne, supra (finding that Town Council’s prayers
referring to Jesus Christ “promoted one religion over all others,
dividing the Town’s citizens along denominational lines”), 376
F.3d 298-99; Simpson, supra (members of Board of Supervisors
disparaged and disrespected Wiccan plaintiff), 404 F.3d 285, n.
4; Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 354
(4th Cir. 2008) (Baptist pastor and city council member sued,
claiming violation of his Free Exercise and Free Speech rights,
when he was forbidden to deliver prayer which would violate
the council’s policy since he intended to close the prayer in the
name of Jesus Christ); Joyner, supra (“To plant sectarian prayers
at the heart of local government is a prescription for religious
discord”), 653 F.3d at 355.

60.

Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004);
Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d
276 (4th Cir. 2005); Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F.Supp.2d 1103
(S.D.Indiana, 2005); Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg,
534 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2008); Joyner v. Forsyth County, 653 F.3d
341 (4th Cir. 2011).

61.

Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008);
Galloway v. Town of Greece, 732 F.Supp.2d 195 (W.D.N.Y.
2010).

62.

Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 795, 794-95 (1983). (“The content
of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as here, there is
no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith
or belief. That being so, it is not for us to embark on a sensitive
evaluation or to parse the content of a particular prayer.”)

63.

Id. at 793.

64.

Town Council meetings in Great Falls, South Carolina opened
with prayers which often invoked Jesus Christ as “Savior,”
and a Wiccan sued to challenge this practice. Wynne v.
Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 301-02 (4th Cir. 2004). The
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order permanently
enjoining such prayers as unconstitutional. Concluding that
the Supreme Court apparently intended to limit its holding
upholding prayer in Marsh to nonsectarian prayers, it
concluded, “The invocations at issue here, which specifically
call upon Jesus Christ, are simply not constitutionally
acceptable legislative prayer like that approved in Marsh.
Rather, they embody the precise kind of ‘advance[ment]’ of
one particular religion that Marsh cautioned against.” Accord,
Joyner v. Forsyth County, 653 F.3d 341, 342 (4th Cir. 2011)
(“…Supreme Court precedent and our own [cases] establish
that in order to survive constitutional scrutiny, invocations
must consist of the type of nonsectarian prayers that solemnize
the legislative task and seek to unite rather than divide.”).

65.
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As noted above, the Court in Marsh, after finding that Chaplain
Palmer’s prayers contained neither efforts to proselytize nor
disparagement of other faiths or beliefs, stated: “That being
so, it is not for us to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to
parse the content of a particular prayer.” 463 U.S. at 794-95.
The Eleventh Circuit in Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d
1263 (2008) took this to mean that Marsh did not prohibit
sectarian prayer, so long as it contained no proselytizing or
disparagement of other religious faiths or beliefs. The majority
of those offering prayers at the Cobb County Commission’s
meetings were Christian, and their prayer often ended with the
words “in Jesus’ name we pray.” Id. at 1267. The court rejected
plaintiffs’ argument that Marsh permitted only “nonsectarian”
prayers at commission meetings: “[T]he Court never held that
the prayers in Marsh were constitutional because they were
‘nonsectarian’…To read Marsh as allowing only non-sectarian
prayers is at odds with the clear directive by the Court that
the content of a legislative prayer ‘is not of concern to judges
where…there is no indication that the prayer opportunity
has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one…faith
or belief. “ Id. at 1271. Accord, Galloway, 681 F.3d 29 (Marsh

“is hard to read, even in light of Allegheny, as saying that
denominational prayers, in and of themselves, violate the
Establishment Clause.”)
66.

Id. at 1272. (“We would not know where to begin to demarcate
the boundary between sectarian and nonsectarian expressions,
and the taxpayers have been opaque in explaining that
standard.”).

67.

653 F.3d at 364. In addition, other cases subsequent to Marsh
raise a series of issues that seem to be beyond the scope of
Galloway but should nevertheless be resolved by the Court.
Among these are the following: Since most of the municipal
councils involved turned the podium for prayers over to
outside volunteers, both clerical and lay, should that make a
difference regarding the applicable rule? If a town or county
is overwhelmingly dominated by people of one faith, does the
town council bear the same burden of trying to locate and invite
minority religion prayer givers? What is the constitutionally
preferred method of compiling a list of prayer givers, and
should prayer givers be chosen from the list at random? If the
list of prayer givers turns out to be overwhelmingly Christian,
for instance, are the efforts of the city council staff to find
minority religion prayer givers irrelevant? Can and should
the Court use this case to attempt to formulate a single test
for constitutionality under the Establishment Clause? Because
of the conflicting interpretations by lower courts of Marsh’s
holding, the Supreme Court should endeavor to provide a clear
and comprehensive set of guidelines to address these issues if it
decides to uphold legislative prayer in general.

68.

The three-part test set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
622 (1971) was the culmination of decades of case law.

69.

The Supreme Court cases outlawing prayer in public schools,
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) and Abingdon School District
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) created furious reactions all over
the country, which led to numerous proposed Constitutional
amendments to overrule their holdings. See generally Frederick
Mark Gedicks and Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion: JudeoChristianity and the Ten Commandments, 110 W.VA.L.R. 275, 28384 (2007).

70.

Joyner v. Forsyth County, 653 F.3d 341, 347 (2011) (“More
broadly, while legislative prayer has the capacity to solemnize
the weighty task of governance and encourage ecumenism
among its participants, it also has the potential to generate
sectarian strife. Such conflict rends communities and does
violence to the pluralistic and inclusive values that are a
defining feature of American public life”).

71.

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.

72.

Paul Freund, “Public Aid to Parochial Schools,” 82 HARV.L.REV.
1680, 1692 (1969). Accord, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639, 717 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

73.

Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 34 (2d Cir. 2012).

74.

Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed., 333 U.S. 203, 217 (1948).

75.

Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1282-91 (Middlebrooks,
J., dissenting).

76.

Id. at 1286.

77.

Id. at 1288 (“[T]he Massachusetts Constitution at the time,
largely written by John and Samuel Adams, established a
state religion financed by tax payers, authorized mandatory
church attendance and the imposition of criminal sanctions for
blasphemy, and discriminated against Catholics”).
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